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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William Lee Cook Ill appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual abuse of
a minor. On appeal he argues that the district court committed fundamental error in the
impaneling of the jury and abused its discretion in an evidentiary ruling.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At the beginning of June, 2013, E.K. stayed the day at the house of her cousin,
William Cook. (Tr., vol. I, p.264, L.17 - p.265, L.11.) Sometime after dinner, when her
aunt had gone to bed, Cook asked E.K. if she would like to play videogames and watch
movies with him in his room.

(Id., p.265, Ls.12-21.)

Eventually, E.K. fell asleep in

Cook's bed while watching a movie. (Id., p.267, Ls.7-21.) E.K. awoke to find her pants
partway down with Cook's hand down her pants, "trying to finger" her. (Id., p.268, L.9 p.269, L.9.) Cook rubbed and fondled E.K.'s buttocks and genitals while masturbating,
ultimately ejaculating on E.K. (Id., p.270, L.16 - p.272, L.20.) Cook was 23 (Tr., vol. 11,
p.73, Ls.20-23) and E.K. was 14 (Tr., vol. I, p.263, Ls.2-4). During a subsequent police
interrogation, Cook confirmed E.K.'s story, admitting that he touched E.K.'s buttocks
and ejaculated on her. (Compare State's Ex. 6 at 12:25:40 - 12:37:48 with Tr., vol. I,
p.265, L.19 - p.272, L.20.)
The state charged Cook with sexual abuse of a minor child. (R., pp.14-15.) The
case proceeded to trial (see Tr., vols. I and 11), following which the jury found Cook guilty
of sexual abuse (R., p.178).

The district court entered judgment against Cook and

sentenced him to a unified term of 15 years with two years fixed. (R., pp.191-92.) Cook
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.202-03.)
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ISSUES
Cook states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court violate Mr. Cook's due process and fair trial
rights by allowing a statutorily unqualified person to sit as a juror?
2.
Did the district court err in excluding all evidence and testimony as
to the results of the DNA testing performed on the pajama bottoms?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Cook failed to show fundamental error in the district court allowing Ms. Hall
to serve on his jury?
2.
Has Cook failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in its ruling on
the state's motion in limine?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Cook Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court Allowing Ms. Hall To
Serve On His Jury

A

Introduction
During voir dire, the district court asked prospective juror Alexa Hall to state her

name, city of residence, employment, and, if married, her spouse's employment. (Tr.,
vol. I, p.72, Ls.6-8.) Ms. Hall explained that she was engaged to a serviceman in the
United States Air Force currently stationed in England, was unemployed, and claimed
that she had moved from Teton County to Rigby. (Id., p.72, Ls.9-21.) Questioned, Ms.
Hall stated that she had lived in Rigby for a couple months and intended for it to be a
permanent move. (Id., p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.2.) Though she had not yet registered to
vote nor changed her driver's license, she intended to. (Id., p.73, Ls.3-11.) She also
acknowledged that she was not working in Rigby, and neither rented nor owned
property in Jefferson County, instead living with a roommate. (Id., p.73, Ls.12-18.)
The court again asked Ms. Hall if she had any intention of returning to Teton
County, and she said that she did not but that she could stay at her brother's place
when she was there. (Id., p.73, L.19 - p.74, L.7.) The court directly asked Ms. Hall if
she considered herself a resident of Teton County and she responded that she grew up
there. (Id., p.74, Ls.8-10.) The court then explained that even though Ms. Hall "may be
temporarily living in another county doesn't mean you're not still a resident legally in
Teton County."

(Id., p.74, Ls.11-14.)

Ms. Hall agreed that she was still legally a

resident of Teton County because that is where her car was registered and where she
had her driver's license issued. (Id., p.74, Ls.15-17.) Though she may have intended to
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change those things in the future, she had not changed it yet, she had not established
any kind of ownership in Jefferson County, and she considered herself still a legal
resident of Teton County. (Id., p.74, L.18 - p.75, L.11.)
The district court then asked:

"Do any of the attorneys want to question her

competency to serve on a Teton County jury?" (Id., p.75, Ls.12-14.) Defense counsel
responded, "Not from the defense's standpoint, your Honor." (Id., p.75, Ls.15-16.) The
prosecutor concurred. (Id., p.75, L.17.)
Now, for the first time on appeal, Cook claims that the district court committed
fundamental error by allowing Ms. Hall to sit on the jury.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-15.)

Cook's claim fails. First, any potential constitutional right Cook may have had to have
Ms. Hall disqualified from serving on the jury panel was waived. Second, it is not clear
from the record above that Ms. Hall was not qualified to serve on Cook's jury panel.
Finally, Cook has failed to attempt to show, much less actually show, that he was
prejudiced by Ms. Hall serving on the jury panel. Cook has failed to show fundamental
error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue.

B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an

alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226,
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

C.

Cook Has Failed To Meet Any Of The Three Prongs Under Perry To Establish
Fundamental Error
For the first time on appeal, Cook asserts that allowing Ms. Hall to serve on his

jury panel was unconstitutional because, he alleges, she was not a resident of Teton
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County.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-15.)

Because Cook did not object to Ms. Hall's jury

service below, he is required to show fundamental error on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.3d at 978. To establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.

lfL at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Cook has failed to meet this burden.
1.

Cook Waived Any Potential Constitutional Right Regarding Ms. Hall's
Residence

Citing the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Nadlman, 63 Idaho 153, 118
P.2d 58 (1941 ), Cook contends that he had a constitutional right to have a jury
composed of Teton County residents. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) Even assuming that
Cook had a constitutional right that Ms. Hall be a resident of Teton County, he waived
that constitutional right when, invited by the district court to express any concerns or
questions regarding Ms. Hall's competence to serve on the jury panel, the defense
instead passed her for cause.
A defendant may waive a constitutional right, so long as it is done knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. Any potential
concerns regarding Ms. Hall's residency were presented and examined during voir dire.
Therefore, when Cook passed Ms. Hall for cause he did so knowingly and intelligently,
and there is no argument that it was not done voluntarily. This stands in stark contrast
to the facts of Nadlman, where the juror summonsed for Nadlman's Bingham County
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trial represented that he was a resident of Bingham County and the defendant did not
know that the juror was not in fact a resident of Bingham County. Nadlman, 63 Idaho
153,118 P. 2d at 61.
The first prong of Perry requires the defendant to show that the alleged error
violates an unwaived constitutional right

Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.

Cook has failed to meet this first prong because, even assuming Cook had a
constitutional right to have Ms. Hall be a resident of Teton County, Cook waived that
right when he passed Ms. Hall for cause.

2.

Whether Ms. Hall Was In Fact A Resident Of Jefferson County Or Was A
Resident Of Teton County Is Not Clear On The Record

To be statutorily qualified to serve as a juror, an individual must be a citizen of
the United States, eighteen years old, and a resident of the county. I.C. § 2-209(2)(a).
Cook claims that Ms. Hall was not qualified to sit on his jury because, he alleges, she
was a resident of Jefferson County. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) But Ms. Hall's residency
is not clear on the record. While she claimed to have moved to Rigby a couple months
prior, she had taken no steps to establish residency in Jefferson County: She neither
rented nor owned a residence, she was not registered to vote there, and her driver's
license and vehicle registration were still in Teton County. (Tr., vol. I, p.72, L.18 - p.73,
L.11; p.74, Ls.15-21; p.74, L.25 - p.75, L.11.)

Similar to her living arrangements in

Jefferson County where she stayed at a friend's place, she was able to stay at her
brother's when she was in Teton County. (Id., p.73, Ls.19-25.) And most importantly,
she still considered herself a legal resident of Teton County. (Id., p.74, Ls.22-24.)
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That Ms. Hall was no longer a resident of Teton County is also not clear under
the law. As noted by Cook, the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act does not define
the term "resident." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) The act does, however, require the jury
commission to
compile and maintain a master jury list consisting of the current voter
registration list for the county supplemented with names from other lists of
persons resident therein, such as lists of utility customers, property
taxpayers, motor vehicle registrations, driver's licenses, and state
identification cards, which the supreme court from time to time designates.
I.C. § 2-206(1) (emphasis added). This suggests that "resident," as contemplated by
the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, includes those who pay utility fees and
property taxes, and who have vehicle registrations and driver's licenses within the
county. As she explained to the court, Ms. Hall has none of those things in Jefferson
County, whereas her driver's license and vehicle registration were both issued in Teton
County. (Tr., vol. I, p.74, L.15 - p.75, L.11.)
Cook argues that the Court should define "resident" as someone who actually
lives in the county. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) But as Ms. Hall explained, she has places to
stay in both Jefferson and Teton County: Whether with her friend in Jefferson County or
with her brother in Teton County. (Tr., vol. I, p.73, L.15 - p.74, L.7.) Ms. Hall neither
rents nor owns either residence. As the district court correctly explained, "temporarily
living in another county doesn't mean you're not still a resident legally in Teton County."
(Id., p.74, Ls.11-14.) This is especially true of someone who appears, as in Ms. Hall's
case, to be temporarily transient.
Under the second prong of Perry, a defendant must show that the error "plainly
exists" in the appellate record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Based on Ms.
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Hall's testimony regarding her many connections to Teton County while under
examination by the district court during voir dire, the error that Cook alleges-that Ms.
Hall was in fact a resident of Jefferson County and thus unqualified to serve on a jury in
Teton County-is not clear on the record. Having failed to meet the second prong of
~ , Cook has failed to show fundamental error.

3.

Because Cook Was Not Deprived Of Counsel And Was Tried By An
Impartial Adjudicator, Ms. Hall's Potential Residence Does Not Amount to
Structural Error

Cook argues that including Ms. Hall on the jury panel amounts to structural error
and therefore he need not show that the alleged error of including Ms. Hall affected the
outcome of his trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) Cook's argument fails.
In support of his argument that allowing Ms. Hall to serve on the jury panel when
she was, allegedly, not a resident of Teton County, Cook cites Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991), and State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 551, 798 P.2d 1, 10 (1990)
(overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)).

Neither case

stands for the proposition that impaneling a nonresident juror amounts to "structural
error."

In Paz, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed claims that Hispanics were

systemically excluded from the jury, and held that Hispanics were not improperly
excluded.

Paz, 118 Idaho at 551-552, 798 P.2d at 10-11. In Fulminante, the United

States Supreme Court listed trial errors which may be structural; this list of errors does
not include the impaneling of a juror who does not reside in the county in which the trial
is held. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
As a general rule, constitutional violations are subject to the harmless error
analysis. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222~223, 245 P. 2d 974-975. However, the United States

8

Supreme Court has recognized that structural errors which affect "the framework within
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself" may not
be subject to harmless error analysis.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08

(1991 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the following errors constitute
structural defects:
(1) complete denial
discrimination in the
representation at trial;
doubt instruction; and
choice.

of counsel; (2) biased trial judge; (3) racial
selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of self(5) denial of a public trial; (6) defective reasonable(7) erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of

Perry, 150 Idaho at 222-23, 245 P.3d at 97 4-75 (internal citations omitted). However,
"if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong
presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to
harmless-error analysis."

kl

(citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).) Cook

had counsel, and nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Hall was unable to be an
impartial adjudicator.
Following the examination of Ms. Hall's residency status highlighted above, the
court continued by asking if she knew anything about the case. (Tr., vol. I, p.75, Ls.1820.) She did not (id., p.75, L.21); nor was she concerned about her ability to be fair and
impartial in consideration of the subject matter of the case (id., p.75, Ls.22-25). Though
she had seen Cook during high school, she had not dated him or associated with him.
(Id., p.76, Ls.1-21.) And Ms. Hall did not know the victim. (Id., p.76, Ls.22-23.) Nothing
in the record suggests that Ms. Hall was unable to be a fair and impartial juror. Cook's
alleged error, therefore, would not be structural.
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Because the error Cook alleges is not structural, he is required to show prejudice
under the third prong of Perry, Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P ,3d at 980, Cook has not
even attempted to show prejudice, nor can he because, as explained above, the record
shows that Ms, Hall was an impartial juror, Having failed to show prejudice, Cook has
failed to establish fundamental error,
Cook has failed to meet any of the prongs articulated by the Court in Perry, He
has failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue,
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed,

IL
Cook Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Its Ruling On
The State's Motion In Limine

A

Introduction
On the eve of trial, hoping to avoid objections during trial, the state filed a motion

in limine seeking to exclude three exhibits anticipated from the defense, including an
Idaho State Police Forensic DNA Report from January 30, 2014,

(R, pp.46-54; see

also Tr,, vol, I, p, 154, L 11 - p, 156, l, 16,) After hearing argument from both parties, the
district court decided to exclude the report because the defense had not subpoenaed
any witness who would be able to lay sufficient foundation for admitting the report, (Id,,
p, 184, LA - p, 186, l,9,) Additionally, the report itself, which apparently showed that no
one's DNA-including the victim's-was found on the pajama pants, would have little
relevance in the trial, (Id,, p, 160, L, 11 - p, 161, l,8,) The parties, however, would still
be able to elicit testimony that during the interrogation of Cook, officers had "bluffed"
when they claimed that Cook's DNA was on EK,'s pajama pants,
p,256, l,3,)
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(Id,, p,245, l,9 -

On appeal Cook argues that the district court abused its discretion in its ruling on
the state's motion in !imine.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-21.)

Cook, however, has not

challenged the actual basis of the district court's ruling and so has failed to establish
any error. Moreover, although Cook appears to argue that the district court should have
reconsidered its ruling on the motion in limine because the state "opened the door" to
the introduction of the DNA report, Cook never asked the court to reconsider its ruling
and, therefore, failed to preserve this claim of error for appellate review.

B.

Standard Of Review
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are generally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion.

State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); State v.

Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 82, 878 P.2d 776, 781 (1994).

C.

Cook Has Failed To Challenge The Basis For The District Court's Ruling
"[T]he admissibility of scientific evidence is governed by the Idaho Rules of

Evidence and the opinions of the Court." State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876, 908 P .2d
566, 569 (1995). Lab reports, by themselves, are generally excluded as hearsay. See
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911-12, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058-59 (2003).

In

order to admit the lab report, Cook was required to lay foundation for the report through
a witness with personal knowledge. I.RE. 602. Because of the scientific nature of the
report, that witness needed to be an expert.

I. R. E. 702. Because neither party had

subpoenaed the lab technician who performed the DNA testing (or any expert) there
was no one to provide the necessary foundation to admit the exhibit. The district court,
therefore, correctly excluded the exhibit.
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On appeal Cook does not address the district court's basis for excluding the DNA
report-that there was no witness to lay foundation for the report.
brief, pp.16-21.)

(See Appellant's

Because he has failed to address this basis for the district court's

ruling, the court's ruling must be affirmed on that unchallenged basis.

See State v.

Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364,366,956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for
a trial court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate court will affirm on the
unchallenged basis).
During trial, Cook was able to elicit testimony that the interrogating officer had
"flat out lied" in regards to DNA evidence inculpating Cook. (Tr., vol. II, p.24, Ls.12-18;
p.28, Ls.5-15.) The interrogating officer in fact had no DNA evidence. (Id., p.18, Ls.213.) Contrary to Cook's assertions on appeal, the district court's ruling did not keep this
relevant information from the jury. The district court's ruling only kept out an exhibit for
which the necessary foundation could not be laid.

D.

Cook Did Not Preserve His Challenge To The District Court's Ruling For
Appellate Review
Instead of challenging the district court's basis for granting the state's motion in

limine, Cook appears to argue that in light of objectionable trial testimony offered by the

officer, the door was "opened" and so the district court should have reconsidered its
ruling on the motion in limine.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-21.)

But this issue is not

preserved for appellate review.
After the district court granted the state's motion in limine, during its examination
of Officer Hale, the prosecutor asked "what other steps in the investigation" the officer
had taken after initially meeting with Cook. (Tr., vol. I, p.240, Ls.11-13.) Unsolicited,
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and despite the prosecutor's specific admonition not to discuss DNA in any way (id.,
p.241, L.20 - p.242, L.7), the officer volunteered that he took DNA samples from
everyone (id., p.240, Ls.14-16).

Following an objection, the prosecutor requested a

sidebar. (Id., p.240, L.21 - p.241, L.3.)
After dismissing the jury, the district court discussed the error with the parties.
(Id., p.241, L.6 - p.249, L.23.) The district court thought it could address the issue with
a curative instruction.

(Id., p.242, Ls.15-20.)

The prosecutor agreed that a curative

instruction would be appropriate. (Id., p.242, L.15 - p.243, L.10.) Defense counsel also
approved of the district court's intention to offer a curative instruction, as long as the
error did not repeat itself. (Id., p.243, L.15 - p.244, L.7.)
Having received the parties' express consent, the district court invited the jury to
return to the courtroom and offered the following curative instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is a matter that I need to discuss
with you briefly.
There was some reference in the earlier testimony concerning
evidence, DNA type genetic evidence and whether or not there may have
been any testing on that or not. And there was an objection which I
sustained. A lot of what happens in trials happens before you ever come
here or happens when you're not in the Court's presence, and I make the
rulings.
made a ruling earlier in this case about what evidence is
admissible and what evidence is not. And there's certain evidence that I
ruled was not admissible. Any reference to any genetic tests in this case
are not for your consideration and you're to disregard anything that may
have been suggested by the question of the prosecutor about testing.
I know it's sometimes hard to pretend you didn't hear something
that you just heard, but that's how our system works. And so I'd ask you
all to please disregard anything that was suggested by Mr. Lundberg's
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question or even the earlier comments about the swabs, because I
previously made rulings.
The evidence that you need to consider in making your decision is
going to be the evidence that I allow to come into the court. Okay? And
so please disregard anything that was said at just the very end of the
witness' testimony concerning any kind of testing that may or may not
have taken place. Okay?
Counsel, you may continue.
(Id., p.250, L.8 - p.251, L.14.)
"Even where a pretrial motion preserves an evidentiary objection for appeal, the
defense may waive the objection during trial." State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 794, 932
P.2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).

Generalized argument made in

response to a pretrial motion in limine does not preserve for appellate review specific
objections to evidence ultimately admitted.

State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 220-21,

207 P.3d 186, 196-97 (Ct. App. 2009). Rather, "[f]or an objection to be preserved for
appellate review, the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated." State v.
Norton, 134 Idaho 875,880, 11 P.3d 494,499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing l.R.E. 103(a)(1);
State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)).
Far from raising the issue of reconsideration in lieu of a curative instruction
during trial, Cook in fact foreclosed it. Defense counsel expressed that the defense was
"fine with [the curative instruction] because reality says even if we now can talk about
these swabs, just based on what's there, we still have this chain of custody issue that
we've all known about from the beginning." (Tr., vol. I, p.243, L.15 - p.244, L.2.) Cook
approved of the curative instruction option below; he did not request a reconsideration
of the ruling on the state's motion in limine.
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Cook cannot now claim that the district

court committed error by giving the approved of curative instruction rather than
reopening its earlier decision on the motion in fimine.

Cook failed to preserve for

appellate review any challenge to the district court's ruling in light of the officer's
objectionable testimony.
Insofar as Cook challenges the district court's order on the state's motion in
limine on its own merits, his challenges fails because the district court's decision was
manifestly correct:

Because there was no expert to explain the DNA analysis and

report, that exhibit could not be placed before the jury.

Because Cook has not

addressed this basis for the district court's ruling, the district court must be affirmed on
this unchallenged basis. Insofar as Cook challenges the district court's ruling in light of
the officer's objectionable testimony, he has failed to preserve this issue and it should
not be considered on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Cook's conviction for sexual
abuse of a minor.
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2015.

~~~-P_EN_C_E_R_ _ __
Deputy Attorney General
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